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CASENOTES
SATTAZAHN V. PENNSYLVANIA: DOUBLE JEOPARDY
AND THE DEFINITION OF "ACQUITTAL" IN CAPITAL-
SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION
According to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, "[nlo person shall.., be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."' The origins of the double
jeopardy doctrine can be traced back more than 2000 years,2 and
it has consistently played an important role in American juris-
prudence.3 The Double Jeopardy Clause has been said to include
three distinct constitutional protections: (1) the protection against
a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) the
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and (3) the protection against multiple convictions for
the same offense.4 Once a defendant is placed in jeopardy for an
offense and jeopardy with respect to that offense terminates, the
defendant may not again be tried or punished for that offense.'
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. George C. Thomas III, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Of-
fense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOwA L. REV. 323, 325 n.8 (1986).
3. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) ("'If there is anything
settled in the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be twice law-
fully punished for the same offence.'") (quoting Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168
(1873)), partially overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1998); Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (discussing the existence of the double jeopardy doc-
trine at English common law and its influence on the Framers of the Constitution).
4. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969). The
Supreme Court has held that the double jeopardy prohibition is applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
5. See Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717.
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Recently, in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania,7 the Supreme Court of
the United States examined whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars the imposition of the death penalty when the defendant is
retried after a judge dismisses the jury as hung and imposes a life
sentence.8 Part II of this note examines the Court's most impor-
tant Double Jeopardy decisions leading up to Sattazahn, particu-
larly in the sentencing context. Part III discusses the factual and
procedural background of Sattazahn. Part IV analyzes the major-
ity and dissenting opinions in Sattazahn and the arguments in
support of and against those opinions. Finally, Part V presents
the potential impact of the Court's decision, including its poten-
tial effects on criminal appeals, state legislatures, and state
courts.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
Over the past century, the Supreme Court attempted to de-
velop and explain its position on the Double Jeopardy Clause in
an effort to clarify the confusion surrounding the doctrine.9 One of
the earliest cases to address the issue of whether a court had the
authority to retry a defendant whose first conviction had been set
aside was United States v. Ball.0 In Ball, three defendants were
tried for murder; two were convicted and one was acquitted. 1 The
original indictment was dismissed on appeal,12 the grand jury re-
turned a new indictment against all three defendants, and all
three were found guilty of murder at the second trial. 3
7. 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
8. Id. at 104-05.
9. This discussion focuses almost exclusively on the ability of a court to impose a
harsher sentence on a defendant on retrial, particularly in capital-sentencing proceedings.
For a discussion of the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause in a variety of other
situations, see GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAw (1998);
William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411 (1993)
(discussing, inter alia, reprosecution of defendants after acquittals, convictions, and mis-
trials). For an in-depth analysis of the cases discussed in Part II of this note, see Jennifer
L. Czernecki, The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution Does Not Bar
the Death Penalty upon Retrial After the Trial Judge Grants a Life Sentence on Behalf of a
Hung Jury: Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 40 DuQ. L. REV. 127 (2001).
10. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
11. Id. at 663-64.
12. The original indictment was quashed after it was found to be fatally defective for
failing to aver either the time or the place of the victim's death. See id. at 664-65.
13. Id. at 664-66.
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The Supreme Court, on appeal, first addressed the lower
court's ability to retry the formerly acquitted defendant and held
that an acquittal acts as a bar to a second prosecution for the
same offense.14 After discussing the traditional English approach
to the issue, 5 the Court stated that "in this country a verdict of
acquittal, although not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offence."'6 As for the for-
merly convicted defendants who had appealed their convictions,
the Court held that there was no bar to their retrial. 7 Subse-
quent decisions would elaborate on these general principles and
explain the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause in cases
where defendants were retried and subjected to more severe sen-
tences than those received after their first trials."8
In Stroud v. United States,9 the defendant was convicted of
murder and given a life sentence at his second trial, after having
previously been found guilty and sentenced to death.2" The second
judgment was reversed, and at the third trial Stroud was again
convicted of murder and sentenced to death.2' The Court only
briefly discussed the Double Jeopardy Clause and held that there
was no bar to the imposition of the death penalty on retrial.22
14. Id. at 671. The Court stated that "[t]he prohibition is not against being twice pun-
ished, but against being twice put in jeopardy; and the accused, whether convicted or ac-
quitted, is equally put in jeopardy at the first trial." Id. at 669.
15. "In England, an acquittal upon an indictment so defective that... it would not
have supported any conviction or sentence, has generally been considered as insufficient to
support a plea of former acquittal." Id. at 666.
16. Id. at 671.
17. Id. at 672. An important fact with regard to the Court's decision was that the ac-
quitted defendant did nothing as to the previous judgment, whereas the other defendants
were attempting to get their convictions set aside. "[Ilt is quite clear that a defendant who
procures a judgment against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew
upon the same indictment, or upon another indictment, for the same offence of which he
had been convicted." Id.; see also THOMAS, supra note 9, at 221-23.
18. See infra notes 19-54 and accompanying text.
19. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
20. Id. at 16-17.
21. Id. at 17.
22. Id. at 18. As in Ball, it was important to the Stroud Court that the defendant was
seeking reversal of his conviction. The Court stated that "the conviction and sentence upon
the former trials were reversed upon writs of error sued out by the plaintiff... which re-
sulted in a further trial. In such cases he is not placed in second jeopardy within the
meaning of the Constitution." Id.
20041
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The Court reaffirmed the basic holding of Stroud fifty years
later in North Carolina v. Pearce." Pearce presented essentially
the same factual scenario as Stroud: two defendants were con-
victed and sentenced, had their convictions set aside, and re-
ceived more severe sentences after their second trials than those
received following their first trials.24 The Court said that beyond
the requirement that credit be given for prison time already
served, "the guarantee against double jeopardy imposes no re-
strictions upon the length of a sentence imposed upon reconvic-
tion."25 Citing Stroud, the Court explicitly stated that, as a corol-
lary to the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in
having his first conviction set aside, a court has the authority to
impose whatever sentence is legally authorized, regardless of
whether the second sentence is more severe than the first.26 The
holding in Pearce "rests ultimately upon the premise that the
original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly
nullified and the slate wiped clean."27 The holding is known as the
"clean slate" rule.
In Bullington v. Missouri," however, the Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause did apply to certain capital-sentencing
proceedings.29 The defendant in Bullington was found guilty of
capital murder and, following a presentence hearing, was sen-
tenced to life in prison.3 ° The defendant was subsequently
granted a new trial and argued that double jeopardy should apply
23. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
24. Id. at 713-15. Pearce was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape and sen-
tenced to a term of twelve to fifteen years. Id. at 713. Several years later he succeeded in
having his conviction reversed. Id. He was retried, convicted, and sentenced to a term of
eight years. Id. When this sentence was added to the time Pearce had already served, the
parties agreed that it amounted to a longer total sentence than that imposed at the first
trial. Id. Rice pleaded guilty to four charges of burglary and was sentenced to prison terms
totaling approximately ten years. Id. at 714. He was also successful in having his judg-
ment set aside. Id. He was retried, convicted, and sentenced to prison terms totaling
twenty-five years. Id.
25. Id. at 719-20.
26. Id. at 720 (citing Stroud, 251 U.S. at 18). One must also remember that the impo-
sition of an increased sentence may be subject to attack as violating due process. See, e.g.,
id. at 723-25; United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-91 (1968). A discussion of due
process considerations with respect to increased sentences imposed on retrial is beyond
the scope of this note.
27. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721.
28. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
29. Id. at 446.
30. Id. at 435-36.
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in an effort to prevent the prosecution from seeking the death
penalty." The Court distinguished Bullington's situation from
previous cases and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did ap-
ply because Missouri's capital-sentencing procedure resembled a
trial on the issue of guilt or innocence.12 Under the Missouri pro-
cedure, the jury was explicitly required to determine whether the
prosecution proved certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt in or-
der to support a death sentence.33 In other words, the jury had to
"convict" or "acquit" the defendant of whatever was necessary for
the death penalty to be imposed. The Court concluded that be-
cause the jury had already "acquitted" the defendant of the death
penalty, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Missouri from seek-
ing the death penalty on retrial.34
The Court further developed its Bullington rationale in Arizona
v. Rumsey.3" In Rumsey, the jury convicted the defendant of mur-
der and robbery, and, under Arizona's statutory scheme, the trial
judge acted as the fact-finder during the sentencing hearing.36 Af-
ter the hearing, the judge determined that no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances were present and, pursuant to Arizona
31. Id. at 436.
32. Id. at 438-39. Although the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the retrial of an
acquitted defendant, the Court noted its historical unwillingness to extend that principle
to sentencing procedures. Id. at 437-38. The Court observed that "[tihe imposition of a
particular sentence usually is not regarded as an 'acquittal' of any more severe sentence
that could have been imposed." Id. at 438. Bullington's situation, however, was different
because of Missouri's detailed sentencing procedure. Id. at 438-39 n.10. The applicable
Missouri sentencing statute at that time provided for a trial-like procedure at the sentenc-
ing phase. See id. (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006 (1978) (repealed 1983)). For a current
version of the relevant sentencing statute, see MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.030 (West Supp.
2003).
33. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 444-45. For example, the procedure required the jury to
hear evidence in mitigation or aggravation of punishment, and any evidence of the pres-
ence or absence of prior convictions, guilty pleas, or pleas of nolo contendere. Id. at 433 n.4
(citing MO. REV. STAT. § 565.006.2 (1978) (repealed 1983)). The statutory scheme required
the jury to consider whether the evidence showed the existence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, and, if the jury decided to impose the death penalty, it was re-
quired to designate, in writing, the circumstances that it found beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 434 (citing Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.012 (1978) (repealed 1983)).
34. Id. at 446.
35. 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
36. Id. at 205. Under Arizona's statutory scheme for sentencing at that time, the trial
judge was instructed to conduct a separate sentencing hearing to consider the presence or
absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and to then determine whether
death was the appropriate sentence. Id. at 205-06 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703
(West Supp. 1983-1984)). For a current version of the relevant sentencing statute, see
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 2003).
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law, sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment.37 On appeal,
the Arizona Supreme Court found that the trial court misinter-
preted one of the statute's aggravating circumstances, and on re-
mand the defendant was sentenced to death.3
The majority in Rumsey held that the Arizona sentencing pro-
cedure was no different from the Missouri procedure at issue in
Bullington.39 The Court explained that the Arizona judge acted
just as the Missouri jury in Bullington acted: he followed strict
statutory standards, made findings with respect to aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, and made a decision that
amounted to an acquittal on the issue of death." Thus, the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause protected the defendant from facing the
death penalty on retrial."
The final case in this line of decisions is Poland v. Arizona. 2 In
Poland, two defendants were tried for murder, convicted, and
sentenced to death by the trial judge. 3 On appeal, the Arizona
Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support the aggra-
vating circumstance relied upon by the trial judge to sentence the
defendants to death." The Arizona Supreme Court did find, how-
ever, sufficient evidence to support a different aggravating cir-
37. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 205-06.
38. Id. at 207-08.
39. Id. at 209-10. "The capital sentencing proceeding in Arizona shares the character-
istics of the Missouri proceeding [in Bullington] that make it resemble a trial for purposes
of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. at 209. Like the statute at issue in Bullington, the
Rumsey Court stated that under the Arizona regime "the State must prove the existence of
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 210.
40. Id. at 210-11.
41. Id. at 212. The Rumsey minority questioned whether the trial court actually did
"implied[ly] acquit[" the defendant because there had been an error of law as to what was
sufficient to establish one of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute. See id. at
213-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
43. Id. at 148-49.
44. Id. at 149-50. The trial judge had found that the defendants "'committed the of-
fense in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.'" Id. at 149 (quoting ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E)(6) (West Supp. 1973)). Section 13-454 was subsequently renum-
bered and can now be found at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West Supp. 2003-2004).
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was in-
sufficient to support a finding of the "'especially heinous, cruel, or depraved'" aggravating
circumstance. Poland, 476 U.S. at 150 (quoting State v. Poland, 645 P.2d 784, 800 (Ariz.
1982)).
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cumstance.45 After being convicted on retrial,46 the defendants
were again sentenced to death.47
The Poland Court distinguished Bullington and Rumsey and
held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the reimposi-
tion of the death penalty.4" The Bullington exception to the "clean
slate" rule 49 did not apply because there was no decision by the
sentencing body that the prosecution did not prove its case. ° In
fact, the prosecution clearly did prove its case, as evidenced by
the trial judge's imposition of the death penalty after the first
trial.5 According to the Court, the proper inquiry established by
Bullington is whether the sentencer decided that the prosecution
had failed to prove that the death penalty was appropriate. 2 In
Rumsey, the sentencer determined that no aggravating circum-
stances were present to support the death penalty, and thus there
had been an acquittal.53 By contrast, in Poland, no such determi-
nation was made, and the mere failure to find the existence of one
particular aggravating circumstance did not amount to an acquit-
tal of the death penalty for double jeopardy purposes. 4
The Court's definition of the Double Jeopardy Clause as estab-
lished by the above case law appears to be straightforward, but
its application has consistently been a source of difficulty for
45. Poland, 467 U.S. at 150. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the trial judge had
misinterpreted whether the defendants "'committed the offense as consideration for the
receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.'"" Id. (citing ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-454(E)(5) (West Supp. 1973)). The court held that this circumstance
was not limited to situations where a contract killing was involved (as the trial judge had
found) and that the trial court could find the existence of that aggravating circumstance
on retrial. Id.
46. Id. The defendants were retried because of evidence that the jury's verdict was
tainted. See id. at 149-50.
47. Id. at 150.
48. Id. at 156-57.
49. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 721; see also text accompanying note 27.
50. Poland, 476 U.S. at 154-55. Writing for the majority, Justice White noted that
"[alt no point during petitioners' first capital sentencing hearing and appeal did either the
sentencer or the reviewing court hold that the prosecution had 'failed to prove its case'
that petitioners deserved the death penalty." Id. at 154.
51. Id. at 154-55.
52. Id. at 155-56. The court stated that it was "not prepared to extend Bullington fur-
ther and view the capital sentencing hearing as a set of minitrials on the existence of each
aggravating circumstance. Such an approach would push the analogy on which Bullington
is based past the breaking point." Id.
53. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 (1984).
54. Poland, 476 U.S. at 155-56.
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judges, scholars, and practitioners.55 It has proven particularly
troublesome in cases where a defendant has been sentenced to
death on retrial after appealing a lesser sentence. In Sattazahn,
the Court again addressed this situation and considered how to
apply the Double Jeopardy Clause in the context of a capital-
sentencing proceeding.
III. BACKGROUND OF THE SATTAZAHN CASE
On the evening of April 12, 1987, David Allen Sattazahn, along
with accomplice Jeffrey Hammer, hid in a wooded area waiting to
rob restaurant manager Richard Boyer.56 At closing, Boyer left
the restaurant and was confronted in the parking lot by Satta-
zahn and Hammer. Sattazahn and Hammer, with their guns
drawn, attempted to rob Boyer of the bank deposit bag containing
the day's earnings. 58 Boyer attempted to flee, at which time both
Sattazahn and Hammer fired shots, several of which struck
Boyer and caused him to fall to the ground.59 Sattazahn and
Hammer grabbed the bank deposit bag and fled, leaving Boyer
dead in the parking lot.60
After a jury trial, Sattazahn was found guilty of numerous
charges, including first-degree murder.61 At sentencing, the jury
deliberated for several hours but was unable to unanimously
agree on a sentence.62 The judge dismissed the jury as hung and,
in accordance with Pennsylvania's capital-sentencing statute, en-
tered a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.63 On appeal, the
55. See, e.g., Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981) ("[The decisional
law in the area [of double jeopardy] is a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to
challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator.").
56. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 362 (Pa. 2000).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Sattazahn was also found guilty of second and third-degree murder, aggra-
vated assault, conspiracy, possessing an instrument of crime, and carrying a firearm with-
out a license. Id.
62. Id. The jury made no decision on life or death, and made no findings regarding the
presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Id.
63. Id. The court issued the life imprisonment sentence based on a Pennsylvania stat-
ute that states that the court, "if it is of the opinion that further deliberation [by the jury]
will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence,... shall sentence the defen-
dant to life imprisonment." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711(c)(1)(v) (West 1998 & Supp.
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Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the conviction and re-
manded for a new trial after determining that the trial judge had
given erroneous instructions to the jury.64
At the second trial, the trial court allowed the prosecution to
again seek the death penalty.6" The jury reinstated the first-
degree murder conviction and sentenced Sattazahn to death.66
Sattazahn appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which
affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.67 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari 6 and held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause did not bar Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty
against Sattazahn on retrial.69
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing for a five-justice majority, focused on the
precise holdings of the Court's prior cases7 ° and explained that
the important double jeopardy inquiry in capital-sentencing cases
is whether there was an acquittal at the trial-like sentencing pro-
ceeding. 1 Under Bullington, Rumsey, and Poland, it is not the
mere imposition of a life sentence that implicates double jeop-
ardy, but rather "whether a first life sentence was an 'acquittal'
based on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the
life sentence-i.e., findings that the government failed to prove
one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt."72 The majority illustrated its interpretation of acquittal by
2003). Neither the judge nor the jury made any findings regarding aggravating or mitigat-
ing factors before the jury was dismissed as hung and the life sentence imposed. Satta-
zahn, 763 A.2d at 362.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 362-63.
66. See id. at 363.
67. Id. at 369. For an analysis of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's ruling and rea-
soning, see Czernecki, supra note 9, at 142-45.
68. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 105 (2003).
69. Id. at 116. In addition, the Court declined to extend the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to provide greater protection against double jeopardy than that
provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 115-16.
70. See supra notes 19-54 and accompanying text.
71. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 112-13.
72. Id. at 108.
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comparing Bullington and Stroud.7" In Stroud, the Court held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar reimposition of the
death penalty at a new trial."4 In Bullington, on the other hand,
the Court found that the Double Jeopardy Clause did bar reimpo-
sition of the death penalty on retrial.75 The difference, Justice
Scalia explained, was that in Stroud "'there was no separate sen-
tencing proceeding at which the prosecution was required to
prove-beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise-additional facts
in order to justify the particular sentence."'76 In other words, in
Stroud there had been no acquittal of the defendant at a trial-like
sentencing proceeding, whereas in Bullington there had been a
separate sentencing proceeding within which the jury acquitted
the defendant.
The decision in Sattazahn, therefore, did not depend on the
sentence imposed at the first trial, but rather on whether that
sentence amounted to an acquittal of the death penalty. The
Court rejected Sattazahn's argument that double jeopardy protec-
tions were triggered when the judge imposed the life sentence
and refused to extend the Bullington exception to Sattazahn's
situation.7 Sattazahn did not establish that the jury or the court
acquitted him of the death penalty, and thus he was not entitled
to a life sentence under the Double Jeopardy Clause.7"
Justice Scalia explained further that the jury did not make any
findings with respect to aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances.79 The fact that the jury deadlocked "cannot fairly be
called an acquittal 'based on findings sufficient to establish legal
entitlement to the life sentence."'' 0 Furthermore, because the
judge simply imposed the life sentence as required by Pennsyl-
vania statute and ""'ma[de] no findings and resolve[d] no factual
matter,' 8' the judge's actions did not amount to an acquittal of
the death penalty. Therefore, Sattazahn was never acquitted of
73. Id. at 106-07.
74. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 17-18 (1919).
75. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981).
76. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 107 (quoting Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439).
77. See id. at 109.
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211 (1984)).
81. Id. at 109-10 (quoting Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 367 (Pa.
2000)).
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the death penalty, and its imposition on retrial did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause.82
The majority opinion discussed United States v. Scott,8 3 which
suggested that double jeopardy might attach where the defendant
"'had either been found not guilty or. . . had at least insisted on
having the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of fact."'" This
statement, according to the majority, was merely dictum and
would be shaky ground on which to rest a decision that prohibited
Pennsylvania from reimposing the death penalty. 5 Furthermore,
Sattazahn asked that the jury be dismissed as hung, as opposed
to 'insist[ing] on having the issue of guilt submitted"' for a merits
determination. 6 Thus, the dictum arguably did not even apply to
Sattazahn's case.87
The majority also noted that Sattazahn's case did not involve
the "'perils against which the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to
protect.' ' 8 The fact that a defendant is subjected to the stress and
anxiety of another trial is not determinative of whether double
jeopardy is implicated. 89 This was not a case in which "'an all-
powerful state [was] relentlessly pursuing a defendant who had
either been found not guilty or who had at least insisted on hav-
ing the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of fact." Satta-
zahn had in fact moved that the jury be discharged and appealed
his conviction.91 For all of these reasons, the Court found that the
82. See id. Following this discussion, Justice Scalia, in Part III of the opinion, sup-
ported the majority's position by discussing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),
in which the Court clarified what constitutes an element of an offense for jury trial pur-
poses. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 111-12. This part of the opinion was joined only by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Id. at 103.
83. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
84. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 113 (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 96) (alteration in original).
85. Id. (describing the notion that Scott supports as "tentative" at best).
86. Id. (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 96) (emphasis removed).
87. See id. at 113-14. Another potential problem with applying Scott in this context is
that Scott dealt with a different type of situation-a dismissal after jeopardy attached.
Such a dismissal must be analyzed to determine if it acts as an acquittal, but this analysis
is somewhat different than that used to determine if there has been an acquittal of the
death penalty at a sentencing proceeding. See McAninch, supra note 9, at 435-36.
88. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 114 (quoting id. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 114-15 (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 96).
91. Id. at 104-05.
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Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the prosecution from seeking
the death penalty on retrial.92
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg, focusing on the historical purposes of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, wrote for the dissent and argued that
the life sentence imposed on Sattazahn should have qualified as a
jeopardy-terminating event, barring the prosecution from seeking
the death penalty at the second trial.9 Justice Ginsburg believed
that the question of whether jeopardy terminated under the cir-
cumstances of the case was a genuinely debatable one,94 and that
under Scott, Sattazahn was entitled to double jeopardy protec-
tion.95
Under the dissent's interpretation of Scott, a defendant has an
interest, beyond obtaining an acquittal, in avoiding multiple
prosecutions even where "'no final determination of guilt or inno-
cence has been made."'9 6 Those interests may be involved in two
situations: (1) when "'the trial judge declares a mistrial;' or (2)
when 'the trial judge terminates the proceedings favorably to the
defendant on a basis not related to factual guilt or innocence.""
Justice Ginsburg believed that Sattazahn's case fell within the
second Scott category98 and argued that, because Sattazahn had
not sought to terminate the proceedings before submitting the
case to the jury, his case was distinguishable from those in which
second prosecutions were allowed. 99 In other words, a trial-
terminating judgment, not prompted by action on the defendant's
92. See id. at 116.
93. Id. at 118 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 119 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 120-27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 120 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82,
92 (1978)).
97. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 92).
98. Id. at 122 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 125-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg argued that the judge's
decision to discharge the jury was not based on a defensive motion, but merely on the
jury's announcement that it could not reach a decision. Id. at 125 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting).
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part, should entitle the defendant to protection under the Double
Jeopardy Clause.' °°
Justice Ginsburg further argued that Sattazahn's second capi-
tal-sentencing proceeding plainly implicated "the perils against
which the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to protect."1 1 In Satta-
zahn, the state had an opportunity to fully present its case to the
jury and to have the jury rule on Sattazahn's guilt or innocence." 2
Furthermore, Sattazahn did not bring about the termination of
his first trial; the decision to discharge the jury resulted not from
any action on his part, but from the simple fact that the jury
deadlocked. 103 Thus, according to the dissent, several of the rea-
sons why double jeopardy protection did not attach in previous
cases were absent in Sattazahn's case.'0 4
Justice Ginsburg suggested two additional-and perhaps more
important-reasons for protecting Sattazahn under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. First, Sattazahn was presented with a "peril-
ous" decision: he could appeal his conviction, but might face the
death penalty if convicted on retrial; on the other hand, if he
chose to forgo his appeal, his life sentence would stand.' 5 "'The
law... should not.., place [defendants] in such an incredible di-
lemma.'"'0 6 Second, the death penalty is a punishment "'unique in
both its severity and its finality,"" 7 which, according to Justice
Ginsburg, exacerbates the anxieties and insecurities of the defen-
dant' and makes the defendant's dilemma much more incredi-
ble.0 9 For these reasons, the dissenters believed that jeopardy
terminated in Sattazahn after the trial judge imposed the life
sentence on the defendant."'
100. Id. at 123 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 124-25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 125 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 125-26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 126 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184,
193 (1957)) (second and third alterations in original).
107. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732
(1998)).
108. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Green, 355 U.S. at 187.
109. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 127 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 128 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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C. The Majority: The Definition of 'Acquittal"
Based on the Court's prior rulings, the majority's decision in
Sattazahn was correct. Under Bullington, Rumsey, and Poland,
an acquittal of the death penalty at the capital-sentencing pro-
ceeding is necessary for a double jeopardy bar to arise."' A defen-
dant has been acquitted when the sentencing body "'decide[s] that
the prosecution has not proved its case' that the death penalty is
appropriate.""2 In the absence of an acquittal of the death pen-
alty, the general rule recognized in Pearce113 applies, and the
Double Jeopardy Clause is not implicated.
In Sattazahn, as in Poland, the sentencer did not decide that
the prosecution had failed to prove its case for the death pen-
alty."4 In fact, the sentencer made no decision at all as to
whether the death penalty was appropriate." 5 Absent any find-
ings regarding aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the fact
that a jury deadlocks cannot be characterized as an acquittal of
the death penalty for double jeopardy purposes.
D. The Dissent's Criticisms and Criticisms of the Dissent
The majority's opinion is open to criticism because the prospect
of facing the death penalty on retrial might place a "chilling ef-
fect" on a defendant's right and decision to appeal. As the dissent
suggested, a defendant in a factual situation similar to that of
Sattazahn is placed in a troubling position: he can either appeal
his conviction and potentially face the death penalty on retrial, or
he can elect not to appeal and be forced to serve his original sen-
tence." 6 Such a dilemma arguably supports double jeopardy ap-
plicability and the position that defendants should be protected
111. See supra notes 28-54 and accompanying text.
112. Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 155 (1986) (quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430, 438 (1981)) (emphasis in original).
113. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
114. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. This point is emphasized by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion. See id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania placed similar emphasis
on the point. See Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 367 (Pa. 2000).
116. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 126 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also text accompanying
note 105.
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from facing harsher penalties, particularly the death penalty, on
retrial.
This criticism does not, however, find support in the Court's
prior decisions. In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,"7 the Court consid-
ered a claim that harsher sentences imposed on retrial are im-
permissible because they place a chilling effect on the defendant's
right to appeal." ' The majority rejected that argument and held
that the possibility of facing a more severe sentence generally
does not place an unjustifiable burden on a defendant's right to
appeal."9
The Chaffin Court noted that the legal system frequently re-
quires people to make difficult choices, and even though "a de-
fendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to
follow whichever course he chooses, the Constitution does not by
that token always forbid requiring him to choose.""2 Despite the
incidental chilling effects the Sattazahn decision might place on a
defendant's right to appeal, the prospect of facing a more severe
sentence on retrial does not impermissibly impair that right.'2 '
The dissent further argued that Sattazahn plainly implicated
the perils against which the Double Jeopardy Clause was meant
to protect.'22 This argument is also problematic. A primary pur-
pose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect defendants from
having to endure second trials.'23 In previous cases, however, the
Court suggested that the protections of the Double Jeopardy
Clause are different when the defendant himself challenges the
conviction or sentence.'24 Sattazahn moved to have the jury dis-
missed as hung, was not acquitted of the death penalty, and sub-
sequently appealed his conviction. Thus, Sattazahn was subjected
to the "ordeal" of a second trial as a result of his own actions.
117. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
118. See id. at 29-35.
119. Id. at 35.
120. Id. at 32 (quoting Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971)); see also Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-53 (1970).
121. See Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 368 (Pa. 2000) (suggesting that
the imposition of a harsher penalty on retrial balances a defendant's right to appeal with
the state's interest in imposing the appropriate punishment).
122. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
123. See supra text accompanying note 4.
124. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720-21 (1969); Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).
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The argument that the prosecution had one complete opportu-
nity to obtain a conviction before a final judgment was entered is
likewise not particularly persuasive. The issue in a case like Sat-
tazahn's is whether the defendant has obtained an acquittal at
the sentencing proceeding. 125 No such decision was ever made by
the sentencing body in Sattazahn as to the prosecution's case for
the death penalty.'26 The fact that the state had "'one complete
opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws .'127 was
not determinative of whether or not the defendant was acquitted
of the death penalty. 128
Finally, although the death penalty is a "different" type of pun-
ishment and the argument that it should be treated differently is
appealing, this argument also does not find support in the Court's
prior cases. The Court has recognized the uniqueness of the death
penalty,129 but has never held that there should be an exception to
a court's ability to impose the death penalty on retrial beyond
that recognized in Bullington."° Thus, the simple fact that the
death penalty is being imposed on retrial does not merit an excep-
tion from the general rule that a court can impose whatever pun-
ishment is legally authorized, even if it is more severe than the
original punishment.3 '
V. IMPACT
In Sattazahn, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule
that courts can impose any legally authorized sentence on re-
trial.132 The Court also reaffirmed that when the sentencing body
acquits the defendant of the death penalty, the state cannot seek
125. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 108-09 (2003).
126. Id. at 117 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 124 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497,
509 (1978)).
128. Id. at 109.
129. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188
(1976).
130. See, e.g., Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156-57 (1986). See also Commonwealth
v. Sattazahn, 763 A.2d 359, 369 (Pa. 2000) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (recognizing that state
and federal precedent would allow a defendant in Sattazahn's situation to be exposed to
the imposition of the death penalty on retrial).
131. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 720 (1969).
132. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 106.
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the death penalty on retrial.'33 The Court's ruling might impact
the decisions made by criminal defendants facing the choice of
whether or not to appeal, and may similarly influence state legis-
latures and courts when they amend or interpret capital-
sentencing statutes.
A. Appeals by Criminal Defendants
Following Sattazahn, a criminal defendant who has received a
mandatory life sentence because a jury could not agree on the
death penalty will have to make a very difficult choice: either ap-
peal and potentially face a harsher punishment on retrial, or
forego an appeal and be required to carry out the original sen-
tence.' Although forcing a defendant to make this decision is not
necessarily unconstitutional, Sattazahn might cause some defen-
dants to accept their original sentences because they fear the
prospect of receiving harsher sentences following an unsuccessful
appeal.
It cannot simply be assumed, however, that the Sattazahn de-
cision will actually deter criminal defendants from appealing
their sentences. For instance, in 1985, four years after the Bull-
ington decision, less than five thousand criminal appeals were
filed in U.S. federal courts. '35 By 1999, that number had more
than doubled. 3 ' While this increase is attributable to a number of
factors such as rising prison populations, it suggests that crimi-
nal defendants during that time period were not significantly de-
terred from pursuing their appeals. As the Chaffin Court noted,
the actual chilling effect of possibly facing a harsher sentence,
given the somewhat speculative nature of that possibility, may
not be of great significance. 37
B. Sattazahn's Influence on State Laws
Sattazahn may cause some state legislatures to revise their
sentencing statutes, and will influence the way state courts in-
133. Id. at 107-08.
134. See supra notes 105-06, 116 and accompanying text.
135. JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1999 WITH
TRENDS 1985-1999, at 1 (2001).
136. Id.
137. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 33-35 (1973).
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terpret those statutes, depending on whether they believe that
Sattazahn was rightly or wrongly decided. If the Pennsylvania
legislature, for example, did "intend[] that the life sentence
should survive vacation of the underlying conviction," 3 ' it might
amend its sentencing scheme to express such an intent.139 A state
court might also interpret its state's statutory sentencing scheme
to fall either inside or outside of Sattazahn's reach.
For example, in 1983, the Missouri legislature revised the
state's laws defining proper procedures for capital cases. 4 ° One
commentator noted that Missouri's new laws and judicial inter-
pretations of those laws "substantially broadened the class of de-
fendants to whom the death penalty is applicable and substan-
tially decreased the likelihood of successful appeal from a
sentence of death." 4 ' This suggests that, in the wake of Bulling-
ton, Missouri desired to strengthen its death penalty laws to limit
the chance that a Bullington-type situation would reoccur.
In contrast, but presumably with a similar desire, Arizona has
not substantially changed its sentencing laws since the Court's
decisions in Rumsey and Poland.'42 The Arizona Supreme Court
recently followed the Sattazahn decision when it applied its capi-
tal-sentencing statute and affirmed the imposition of the death
penalty on a number of defendants who appealed their original
convictions. 4 3 States that agree with the Sattazahn decision will
likely follow the approaches of Missouri or Arizona: either
strengthen their death penalty laws, or interpret Sattazahn to
apply in similar cases. States that disagree with Sattazahn might
choose to change their sentencing laws, or interpret Sattazahn
very narrowly to limit its application.' As the vast majority of
states currently sanction the death penalty, 4 ' it would be surpris-
138. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 110.
139. As of the writing of this article, no significant changes had been made to Pennsyl-
vania's sentencing statute. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (West 1998 & Supp. 2003).
140. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.030, .032 (West 1999 & Supp. 2003).
141. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Recent Developments in Missouri: The Death Penalty, 54 U.
Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 553, 553 (1986).
142. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.01 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002).
143. See State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 928-31 (Ariz. 2003).
144. For instance, one recent unpublished case from the Sixth Circuit suggested that
Sattazahn might not apply in a similar case. See Pitcher v. Huffman, 65 Fed. Appx. 979,
982-83 n.1 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion).
145. See, e.g., Jaime L. Henshaw, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: The Court's Failure to Rec-
ognize What Lies Beneath, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1207 (2003) (noting that thirty-eight
states allow the death penalty).
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ing if any more than a few states choose to adjust their capital-
sentencing statutes in efforts to limit Sattazahn.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the state of the law has not been changed dramati-
cally by the Sattazahn decision, Sattazahn does restrict the cir-
cumstances under which the Bullington exception will be applied
in capital-sentencing cases. The Sattazahn Court made it clear
that if a defendant is not acquitted of the death penalty, the state
may seek the death penalty on retrial.146 Based on its reasoning
and its interpretation of Scott, the Court appears unwilling to
further extend the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause to
similar cases in the future.147
The Supreme Court has had difficulty explaining the proper
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the context of capi-
tal-sentencing proceedings. Despite the Court's attempts at clari-
fication, courts and legislatures will likely continue to struggle
when deciding how to properly balance the rights of criminal de-
fendants with the states' interests in imposing appropriate pun-
ishments. For now, however, the Court has confirmed that in
capital-sentencing proceedings, it is not the life sentence imposed
at the first trial that is the touchstone for double jeopardy, but
whether the imposition of the life sentence acquitted the defen-
dant of the death penalty.1 48
Matthew G. Howells
146. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 106-07, 109 (2003).
147. Scott suggested that double jeopardy may attach even where no determination of
guilt or innocence had been made. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978). The
Sattazahn majority characterized that statement as mere dictum and declined to apply it
to Sattazahn's case. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 113-14. This may imply that the Justices
in the majority will decline to extend double jeopardy protections under similar circum-
stances in the future. The majority may also be blurring the line that separates a court's
sua sponte actions from its actions in response to a defendant's motion. See id. at 114
("Surely double jeopardy protections cannot hinge on whether a trial court characterizes
its action as self-initiated or in response to motion."). The Court will need to revisit Satta-
zahn in different contexts, such as when a judge declares a mistrial or where a defendant
receives less than a life sentence at his first trial, to clarify exactly when double jeopardy
attaches and how Sattazahn will be applied.
148. See id. at 537 U.S. at 107, 109.
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